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PROPERTY*
Symeon Symeonides**
POSSESSION

Possession Against the State
Chaney v. State Mineral Board,I and Todd v. Department of Natural
Resources' were possessory actions brought against the state by private
persons. In both, the trial courts had rendered judgments for plaintiffs,
and the appellate courts affirmed. In Chaney, the property in question
was the bed of the Amite River, apparently a navigable river. The court
held that since "the type of corporeal actions necessary to support possession depend on the nature of the land and the use to which the land
is destined" 3 one may establish possession of a riverbed by "fishing, swimming, dredging the bed for sand and gravel, and posting 'no fishingswimming' signs on the banks." 4 The defendant apparently had not
raised the issue of navigability of the river in question and the concomitant issue of public ownership of the bed thereof. In Todd, the disputed
property was accretion according to the plaintiff's allegations, and the
"former bed" 5 of the Mississippi River according to the state's allegations. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that the
disputed property was accretion 6 and granted plaintiff the requested
possessory protection. The court briefly but specifically dismissed the state's
defense that "possessory actions against the State are prohibited."'
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs in both cases,' which are
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* This article deals only with the jurisprudential developments in the period of August
1982 to August 1983. For legislative developments in the same period, see Symeonides, One
Hundred Footnotes to the New Law of Possession and Acquisitive Prescription, 44 LA.
L. REV. 69 (1983). All the Civil Code provisions concerning the law of property have by
now been revised in a process that lasted from 1976 to 1982. However, for obvious reasons,
the old law continues to be relevant and is cited often in this paper. To avoid confusion
or needless repetition, the following abbreviations have been adopted in both the text and
footnotes: OA refers to the property articles of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 as they
existed before their revision in 1976-1982. NA refers to the property articles of the Civil
Code as revised in 1976-1982 and currently in force. UA refers to articles of the Civil Code
which were not affected by the recent revisions.
** Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 428 So. 2d 880 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ granted, 433 So. 2d 712 (1983).
2. 422 So. 2d 1353 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writ granted, 427 So. 2d 1199 (1983).
3. 428 So. 2d at 881. See also Cheramie v. Cheramie, 391 So. 2d 1126 (La. 1980);
Veltin v. Haas, 207 La. 650, 21 So. 2d 862 (1945).
4. 428 So. 2d at 881.
5. 422 So. 2d at 1354 (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 1355.
7. Id. at 1354. The court relied on St. Mary Parish Land Co. v. State Mineral Board,
167 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 246 La. 908, 168 So. 2d 821 (1964).
8. See Chaney v. State Mineral Bd., 433 So. 2d 712 (1983); Todd v. Department of
Natural Resources, 427 So. 2d 1199 (1983). The two cases have been consolidated for review.
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now pending before the court. Whatever concern there may be that the
following comments might influence the court's opinion is allayed because
the court's decision will most probably be rendered well before these comments appear in print. This writer has no way of knowing the particular
grounds on which the petitioners requested writs, but based on the
arguments raised by the state in Todd, there is a strong likelihood that
the supreme court's review will center around the permissibility of
possessory actions against the state. The state argued in Todd that, since
things belonging to the state are imprescriptible, 9 they are also insusceptible to adverse possession by private persons. Hence possessory actions
against the state are prohibited.'" The state phrased its argument in broad
enough terms to encompass not only things that the state owns in its
capacity as a public person (hereinafter referred to as "public things"),''
but also things which the state claims to own in its capacity as a private
person (hereinafter referred to as "private things")." Indeed, the state
implicitly admitted in Todd that the land in dispute was a private rather
than a public thing by referring to it as the "former"' 3 rather than the

9. See LA. CONST. art. IX, § 4(B), art. XII, § 13; A. YIANNOPOULOS,
33-34 in 2 LOuISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 91-98 (2d ed. 1980).
10.
11.

PROPERTY §§

See 422 So. 2d at 1354.
New article 450 provides:
Public things are owned by the state or its political subdivisions in their capacity as public persons.
Public things that belong to the state are such as running waters, the waters
and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the territorial sea, and the seashore.
Public things that may belong to political subdivisions of the state are such
as streets and public squares.
The term public things is equivalent to the old term things of the public domain, see
OA 453, 482(2), but is not equivalent to the term public property. The latter term includes
all property owned by a public entity in whatever capacity. For a thorough discussion of
the matter, see A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 33, at 91-94.
12. New article 453 provides: "Private things are owned by individuals, other private
persons, and by the state or its political subdivisions in their capacity as private persons."
13. See 422 So. 2d at 1354. If something is the former bed of the river, it means
that it is no longer the bed of the river, i.e., it is presently above the ordinary low water
mark, and thus does not fall within the things classified as public things by NA 450. The
former bed is likely to have become either (a) the "abandoned bed" of a river that has
opened a new channel, see NA 504; (b) alluvion or dereliction, see NA 499; or (c) an "island
or sandbar not attached to the bank." NA 505. In all three situations the former bed will
be a private thing by the express language of the Code. In situation (a) the abandoned
bed is expressly given "by way of indemnification" to "the owners of the land on which
the new bed is located." NA 504. In situation (b) the alluvion or dereliction is expressly
given to the riparian owners by NA 499. In contrast, alluvion and dereliction on the shores
of sea or navigable lakes belong to the state by virtue of NA 500 in conjunction with the
Miami doctrine. See Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1937). In situation
(c) the island or sandbar belongs to the state according to NA 504, but there is nothing
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present bed of the Mississippi River. In contrast, the court in Chaney
was referring to the disputed land as the "riverbed""' of the Amite River,
which will admittedly be a public thing if the river in question is
navigable."' The two cases present analytically different questions to the
extent that one involves private things and the other involves public things.
The state's position that, with regard to private things, possessory
actions against the state are prohibited, has no foundation in law or policy.
To this writer's knowledge, there is no legislative provision containing
such a prohibition or differentiating between parties to a possessory action on the basis of their identity as public or private entities. The only
provision that ever differentiated between litigants on that 'basis is former
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5061 which provided as follows:
Whenever the state, a municipality, town or village thereof, is
sued as a defendant in a possessory action brought by any person, firm, or corporation claiming to possess as owner, usufructuary, or claiming a real right to property, which is also claimed
by the state, a municipality, town or village thereof, to be public
property constituting a locus publicus, then, in such cases the
possessory and petitory actions shall be cumulated and the claim
of title or real right vel non, of the person, firm, or corporation
bringing such possessory action shall be tried contradictorily with
the claim of title of the state, municipality, town or village thereof,
and any judgment rendered on the petitory phase of such suit
shall carry with it a determination of the possessory action in favor
of the party whose petitory claim has been affirmed and recog-

to suggest that it is owned by the state in its capacity as a public person. In fact, the
predecessor of NA 504, OA 512, made that clear by providing that these islands "belong
to the State, if there be no adverse title or prescription." (Emphasis added). Since at the
time of the enactment of this article (1870) and up to the 1921 constitution private things
of the state were prescriptible and public things were not, the conclusion is inescapable
that these islands were viewed by the legislature as private rather than public things. The
1978 revision of OA 512 has done nothing to change that state of affairs. An island formed
on the bed of a navigable river and not attached to the bank is a private thing, normally
belonging to the state. It is not a public thing just because the state owns it. In order
for it to become public, the state must show some form of dedication to public use which
was not argued in Todd.
14. 428 So. 2d at 881.
15. See NA 450. The bed of a navigable river is defined as "the land that is covered
by the water in its ordinary low stage." Wemple v. Eastham, 150 La. 247, 251, 90 So.
637, 638 (1922). "The state owns the beds of navigable rivers from the mean low ordinary
watermark on one side to the mean low watermark on the other side." A. YIANNoPoULos,
supra note 9, § 46, at 132. "A private person may own a navigable water body [only]
if his ownership thereof was recognized by final judgment under the authority of California
v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954)." Id. § 41, at 107 n.2.
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nized. All such cumulated actions of the character herein described

shall be tried by preference in all courts.' 6
By clear implication the above provision allowed possessory actions
against the state with regard to things not "constituting locus publicus,"
i.e., private things. Even with regard to public things, the above statute
does not really prohibit possessory actions against the State. It simply

imposes the very sensible requirement of a compulsory cumulation of the
possessory and petitory actions, which is quite a different matter.' 7 In
1960, Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5061 was repealed and replaced by
articles 3651-3664 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.' 8 The ar-

ticles make the possessory action available, under the requirements specified
therein, to all persons, private or public, against all persons, private or
public, and with regard to all things, private or public.' 9 The Civil Code

also contains no prohibition against private adverse possession of private
things claimed by the state. The only such prohibition contained in the
Civil Code is in NA 458 which, however, pertains to public things2" and
thus confirms the argument that private things of the state are susceptible

to adverse possession.
The only remaining basis for the state's argument is the constitutional
provision declaring that "[lands .. .of the state . . . shall not be lost
by prescription."'" Does this provision necessarily mean that such lands

of the state are also insusceptible to possession? With regard to lands
16. LA. R.S. 13:5061 (1950) (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1960 La. Acts, No.
32, § 2). Initially enacted by Act 82 of 1930.
17. Requiring cumulation of the two actions is not equivalent to forfeiting the possessory
action but simply forces adjudication of the two actions at the same time. Presumably,
possession does, or should, remain the arbiter of the burden of proof in the petitory action.
This means that if the plaintiff is found to be in possession, he will have to carry a lighter
burden of proof in the petitory action. See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text. This
will not be so if one accepts the state's argument that a private person cannot be in possession of property claimed by the state. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
18. See comments by Henry G. McMahon under former LA. R.S. 13:5036 (1950). Undocumented information made available to the writer suggests that LA. R.S. 13:5061 was
repealed in 1960 under the belief that the new Code of Civil Procedure about to be promulgated later that year would require a compulsory cumulation of possessory and petitory
actions in all cases, not just in those involving the state. However, a different policy prevailed
in the drafting of the Code of Civil Procedure which now prohibits, as a general matter,
the cumulation of the two actions. For some reason, LA. R.S. 13:5061 was never reenacted.
19. See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3655-3656. See also LA. R.S. 13:5103 which provides as follows: "All procedural questions arising in suits on claims against the state, state
agencies, or political subdivisions shall be determined, except as the contrary is specified
in this Part, in accordance with the rules of law applicable to suits between private parties."
20. NA 458, quoted infra text accompanying note 35. For a discussion of this article,
see infra note 36; see also NA 459.
21. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 4(B).
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claimed by the state in its capacity as a private person, the answer must
be an unqualified "no." Possession is a "matter of fact" 22 from which
stems a bundle of rights2" including the "right to possess," 2" namely the
right to be protected by the possessory action upon completion of one
full year in possession. With the exception of the right to acquire ownership by prescription in due time,2" all these rights are accorded a possessor
without regard to whether the entity against whom he is possessing is
private or public, and indeed without regard to whether the property he
is possessing is a public or a private thing.26 Of all these rights of possessors
the constitution has curtailed only one (the right to prescribe against the
state) and has allowed all the rest. The legislature could perhaps curtail
a few more of these rights but has chosen not to do so. To take away
these rights through procedural techniques 27 and by judicial fiat would
amount to taking of private property without due process.
The following hypothetical (but not inconceivable) scenario may
demonstrate that, at least in some cases, acceptance of the state's argument will result in a virtual confiscation of private property. Suppose that
22. NA 3422; OA 3434 para. 2. In a sense, adverse possession always begins "illegally"
in that it violates the legally protected right of the owner to the exclusive use and enjoyment of his property. See NA 477. Yet, at some point, the law recognizes this state of
fact and accords the possessor certain rights, including the right to possess, see infra note
24, i.e., a temporary possessory protection until the real owner comes forward and proves
his ownership. As long as the property subject to possession is not a public thing, these
rights flow to the possessor regardless of who the owner is, whether a private or a public
person. In other words, adverse possession of property which the state claims to or does
indeed own in its capacity as a private person is no more "illegal" than property owned
by a private person. Illegality is nowhere mentioned by the Civil Code as a vice of possession. See, e.g., NA 3435-3436; OA 3487, 3491.
23. Among these rights are: (1) "the right to possess," see infra note 24; (2) the right
to be considered provisionally as owner of the thing possessed until the right of the true
owner is established, NA 3423; OA 3454(1); (3) the right to gather the fruits, NA 486-488;
(4) the right to remove improvements or to be reimbursed for them-NA 496-497; (5) the
right to be reimbursed for useful or necessary expenses, NA 527, 529; and (6) the right
to prescribe in due time, NA 3446; OA 3454(3).
24. The term right to possess is a new term of art first articulated in Liner v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 766, 781 (La. 1975) (Tate, J., concurring in
denial of rehearing), and now codified in NA 3422. This right comes into existence the
moment a possessor who meets all the other qualifications completes one year of possession. Other rights are accorded a possessor even before he completes one full year of possession, such as when he is evicted by force or fraud. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3658(2).
Similarly, a possessor's right to the fruits, UA 486, his rights to remove improvements made
on the land of another or to be reimbursed for them, UA 496-497, and his right to be
reimbursed for useful or necessary expenses, UA 527, 529 do not depend on the length
of his possession but rather on his good or bad faith.
25. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 4(B).
26. The only exception to this latter statement is NA 458 which is discussed infra note 36.
27. See the contrary command of LA. R.S. 13:5103, quoted supra note 19.
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the state grants mineral leases or disturbs in any other way the possession
of dry land possessed for the last one hundred years by a private person
and his ancestors. Normally that person could protect himself against such
disturbances through the speedy and easy vehicle of the possessory action.28
The disturber would have to reconvene by a petitory action and carry
the burden of proving his ownership.2 9 Since the disturber happened to
be the state, the following consequences flow under the above argument.
(1) The possessor is deprived of the temporary protection of the possessory
action and the advantages of being a defendant in possession in a petitory
action.3" (2) The state is relieved of the burden of a plaintiff in a petitory
action against a defendant in possession and assumes the position of a
defendant in possession in a petitory action. (3) The possessor is forced
to bring the petitory action and carry the burden of proof of a plantiff
out of possession (despite his actual possession), against a defendant who
is legally though not actually in possession. 3' This burden may be insurmountable. Since prescription is not available to him, he will have to trace
his title back to the sovereign. If for some reason he is unable to do
that, either because there is a minute break in his chain of title or for
instance because the courthouse burned down, he will lose the petitory
action even though the state has no semblance of title and is not actually
in possession.3 2 It is hard to imagine that such consequences were contemplated by either the delegates to the constitutional convention or the
state legislators.

28. See LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3655, 3658-3659.
29. See LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3657 paras. 2-3, 3653(1); NA 531.
30. The advantage consists in being considered provisionally the owner, NA 3423; OA
3454(1), until the plaintiff carries his burden of proving his ownership under the standards
of article 3653(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
31. The plaintiff's burden of proof consists of proving ownership, LA. CODE Civ. P.
art. 3653(l); NA 531, by relying on the strength of his own title rather than the weakness
of the defendant's title. Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 294 So. 2d 797 (La. 1974). It is true
that in an ordinary petitory action, the fact that the plaintiff is not in possession does
not necessarily mean that the defendant is in possession. It is possible that neither of the
two is in possession, and if so, the plaintiff's burden of proof is lighter. Under article
3653(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and NA 531, the plaintiff prevails by merely showing "better title" than the defendant. However, according to the state's argument or its
logical extension, this lighter burden of proof will not be available to the plaintiff. The
reason the state argues that the plaintiff is not in possession is not because he is actually
not in possession but because he cannot legally be in possession. That leaves the state in
possession.
32. It could be argued that this is simply the consequence of the Skinner rule, Pure
Oil Co. v. Skinner, 294 So. 2d 797 (La. 1974), see supra note 31, which is nonetheless
an established rule of law and now codified in article 3653(l) of the Code of Civil Procedure and NA 531. However, in petitory actions between private individuals, the Skinner
rule is not as harsh as it sounds because prescription is always available in such actions.
Furthermore, the Skinner rule does not in such disputes protect a defendant who is not
actually in possession.
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The discussion has so far focused on private things claimed by the
state. Public things present a different range of questions. Although both
jurisprudence33 and doctrine ' are equivocal on the matter, there is some
legislative authority for the proposition that adverse possession of public
things is ineffective. Civil Code article 458 provides:
Works built without lawful permit on public things, including
the sea, the seashore, and the bottom of natural navigable waters,
or on the banks of navigable rivers, that obstruct the public use
may be removed at the expense of persons who built or own them
at the instance of public authorities, or of any person residing
in the state. The owner of the works may not prevent their
removal by alleging prescription or possession.33
Although the article lacks the desired degree of generality3" there are suf33. Parkway Dev. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 342 So. 2d 151 (La. 1977), involved
the analytically distinct question of the quasi-possession of a servitude granted by the city,
i.e., possession which is by definition precarious rather than adverse to the city. The court
recognized that the question of adverse possession against things in the public domain was
unsettled. Older cases which permitted possessory actions against the state as to navigable
waterbodies are of little aid because they were decided under the regime of California v.
Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954) which had held that it was possible for private
persons not only to possess but also to own bottoms of navigable waterbodies. See, e.g.,
St. Mary Parish Land Co. v. State Mineral Board, 167 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 246 La. 908, 168 So. 2d 821 (1964).
34. Louisiana authors do not address the question, but French authorities take the position that possessory actions cannot be brought against the state for things in the public
domain. See 2 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 185 (7th ed. Esmein 1961)
in J. MAYDA 2 CIvI. LAW TRANSLATIONS 129 (1966); I M. PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL
LAW, pt. 2, no. 2265, at 324 (12th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959). However, it is suggested that the French solutions to this issue are not readily transferable to Louisiana because
of a relatively different concept of public ownership in France, as well as a slightly different philosophy in the allocation of the burden of proof in possessory and petitory actions.
35. Enacted by Act 728 of 1978 replacing OA 861 without substantive change. New
article 459 creates an exception to NA 458 by allowing, under the conditions specified therein,
private possession of a building that "merely encroaches on a public way without preventing its use."
36. New article 458 addresses the narrow problem of obstructions to public use and
seeks to ensure that such obstructions will be removed in a speedy and inexpensive manner.
It is very doubtful that the article addresses the more general problem of whether public
things are susceptible to adverse possession. These doubts are confirmed by the context
in which both NA 458 and especially its predecessor OA 861 were placed (Old article 861
was under the title "Of New Works, the Erection of Which Can Be Stopped or Prevented"),
the reference in NA 458 to "the banks of navigable rivers" which are, of course, private
things subject to public use, NA 456, and the reference to the person who built the works
as the "owner" of them. Under the law of accession, see NA 493, a person who builds
improvements on the land of another is owner of them only if he secured the consent of
the landowner. Apparently then, NA 458 does not address the general problem of adverse
possession of public things but rather the more specific problem of structures obstructing
the public use (no matter by whom they were built), and it seeks to ensure their removal
without the constraints of the law of accession by providing that "[tihe owner of the works
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ficient policy reasons to support the proposition that, as a general matter, adverse possession of public things should produce no legal effect
including the right to possess. However, article 458 presupposes that the

nature of the thing as public is not in dispute.37
The real question is who should bear the burden of proving, in case
of dispute, whether the thing is public or private. Should the plaintiff
be required to prove affirmatively that the thing in question is private
before he is allowed to proceed with his possessory action, or should the
state have to show that the thing is public in order to defeat the possessory
action? Either way, resolution of this issue, in the majority of cases, would
not only make the action petitory but also decide the petitory action.3"
This is probably the reason for which the old law required the compulsory
cumulation of the possessory and petitory actions in disputes of this kind.39
The further, and most crucial, question is whether possession should
remain the arbiter of the burden of proof in this converted petitory action. There should be little hesitation in accepting an affirmative answer.
Article 458 does not negate this answer, which is confirmed by all other
pertinent articles of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure. °

A plaintiff who shows possession satisfying the requirements of the Code
may not prevent their removal by alleging . . . possession," and by imposing on the owner
the expenses of the removal. Both of these principles seem to be directed particularly against
the good faith possessor since it is only he that can prevent the removal by asserting possession. See NA 496, 529.
37. When the disputed thing is proven to be a public thing, the possessor automatically
loses the right to possess which is after all subordinate to the right of ownership, here
public ownership. Nevertheless, an evicted possessor has the right of retaining possession
until he is reimbursed for improvements and expenses which he is entitled to claim. NA
529. The meaning of NA 458 is that in the case of public things the possessor is not entitled
to retain possession under NA 529. See supra note 36. All this is true however only in
so far as the property in question is proven to be public.
38. In Todd both plaintiff and defendant made assertions which could convert the action into a petitory one. Plaintiff asserted that the disputed land was accretion. The court
found, however, that this assertion "related to the extent and length of possession by the
plaintiffs," 422 So. 2d at 1355, and thus fell within the confines of article 3661 of the
Code of Civil Procedure which allows evidence of title to be presented in a possessory action for certain limited purposes. The state argued that the land in question was the "former
bed" of the Mississippi River. See supra note 13. The court did not consider whether this
assertion converted the action into a petitory one. If the state were to argue in Todd, as
it could but did not in Chaney, that the disputed land is the present bed of the Mississippi,
would this not make the action petitory? Most probably so. Moreover, a finding by the
court that the land was indeed part of the riverbed would also decide the petitory action
since bottoms of navigable waterbodies belong ex hypothesi to the state. See NA 450; supra
note 11.
39. See LA. R.S. 13:5061 (1950) (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1960 La. Acts,
No. 32, § 2, quoted supra text accompanying note 16). This is also the reason why it would
be advisable to reenact LA. R.S. 13:5061. However, for the reasons suggested in the text,
possession should remain the arbiter of the burden of proof in this cumulated action.
40. See, e.g., LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3653; NA 531.
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of Civil Procedure4 1 should remain in possession until the state shows
that the thing in question is a thing in the public domain. The state should
not be able to defeat the possessory action by simply claiming without
proof that the thing belongs to the public domain. Nor should such a

claim release the state from its own burden of proving ownership and
place that burden on the plaintiff. The state should have to defend the

possessory action either by disproving plaintiff's possession or by reconvening with a petitory action in which case the state should be required to
42
carry the burden of proving ownership.
Conflicting Constructive Possessions
Under NA 3426 and OA 3437 and 3498, one who possesses part of
an immovable by virtue of title is deemed to have constructive possession

of the whole described in the title. Neither the new article nor its antecedent provisions provide the means of delineating the constructive possessions of persons possessing by virtue of partially or totally overlapping
titles. 4 3 Whitley v. Texaco, Inc.4 4 addressed this problem of partially
overlapping titles. On original hearing, the court held that the two conflicting constructive possessions "offset each other ' 4 5 and went on to adjudicate ownership to defendant on the basis of better title.4 6 On rehear-

ing, the court held instead that of the two conflicting constructive possessions, the one first established prevails. 47 Since the defendant's constructive possession was established first and since the plaintiff's subsequent

acts of adverse possession, being mere disturbances not amounting to eviction, did not oust defendant's possession, the original result was confirmed.
The defendant was declared owner on the basis of the ten-year acquisitive
48

prescription.

The court's holding means that once established, whether corporeally
or constructively, possession can be ousted by nothing short of adverse
41. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3658.
42. This burden is significantly lighter than that of any other plaintiff out of possession. All the state has to show is that the thing in question falls under the definition of
public things under NA 450. This is done either by proving that the disputed land is covered
by navigable waterways or that it has been validly dedicated to public use.
43. For a discussion of some other aspects of the same problem, see Symeonides, One
Hundred Footnotes to the New Law of Possession and Acquisitive Prescription, 44 LA.
L. REv. 69, 76-78 (1983).
44. 434 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 106. Although erroneous under the jurisprudence, see infra note 49, this
holding has some logic to it. The fiction on which constructive possession is essentially
based will work only so long as nobody else appears on the scene who is entitled to invoke
the same fiction. When this happens, the two fictitious possessions cancel each other out.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 107-08.
48. Id. at 109.
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corporeal possession; adverse constructive possession or disturbances not
amounting to eviction will not suffice. Although the holding is consistent
with the jurisprudence 9 and has sufficient foundation in codal language,5"
it is unnecessarily rigid in failing to differentiate between the various kinds
of possession (corporeal, civil, and constructive) and what is necessary
to oust each kind of possession.

The holding relies too much on the principle of potior tempore potior
jure as a tool for ranking the various kinds of possessions and for resolving conflicts between them. A more subtle approach to the problem,
however, should consider two other factors in resolving these conflicts:
the relative intensity or visibility of the respective physical activities of
the two possessors on the disputed property (hereinafter referred to as
"visibility"), and the concomitant element of notice by the second
possessor to the first possessor and the world in general that the first
possessor's dominion is challenged (hereinafter referred to as "notice").
Indeed, there seems to be only one category of cases where the principle
of priority in time is the controlling consideration in deciding disputes
between conflicting possessions: the cases holding that it takes more acts

to oust an existing corporeal possession than to establish a new one. 5 '
In all other conflicts, the principle of priority in time is, or should be,
combined with the other two considerations of visibility and notice. Thus,
the principle that disturbances not amounting to eviction cannot oust an
49. [I]t is manifestly impossible that there should be two constructive possessions
at one and the same time of the same property. The person first holding constructive possession of a particular property under a title maintains it as against
later alleged constructive possession of the same property by another person. The
possession of the latter is limited to the precise property of which he has actual
possession.
Whitley, 434 So. 2d at 107 (quoting Gilmore v. Schenck, 115 La. 386, 398, 39 So. 40,
44 (1905)).
50. The pertinent article of the Civil Code, NA 3433, (OA 3449) provides that possession is lost either by abandonment or by eviction or usurpation by another. Since the article
does not distinguish between the various gradations of possession, one may assume that
all three kinds of possession (corporeal, civil, and constructive) may be ousted only by eviction or usurpation. What constitutes eviction or usurpation is a question of fact. But, since
it is clear that a mere constructive possession falls well short of eviction or usurpation,
it is safe to assume that such constructive possession cannot oust an existing possession
of any gradation. However, for reasons explained in the text this assumption, though literally
correct, seems too simplistic to be useful.
51. Compare Wagley v. Cross, 347 So. 2d 859 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) (holding that
the mowing of grass is sufficient to maintain possession) with Richard v. Comeaux, 260
So. 2d 350 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972) (holding that the mowing of grass was not sufficient
to oust an existing corporeal possession). See also A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 212,
at 567 n.370, 568 n.375. It is doubtful that these holdings may be generalized into a workable
principle, but to the extent that they can, the principle of potior tempore may help rationalize them.
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existing corporeal possession' 2 is explained not so much on the basis of
potior tempore potior jure as on the basis of the other two factors of
visibility and notice. Such disturbances are simply not visible or permanent enough to put the possessor on notice that his dominion is
challenged." Similarly, it is the combination of all three aforementioned
factors which dictates that of two overlapping constructive possessions,
the one first established prevails. Since neither of the two possessors conducts any physical activity on the disputed strip and, therefore, neither
gives notice to the other of an intent to possess, the only remaining basis
for resolving the conflict is the priority-in-time principle. When, however,
the second constructive possession is accompanied by visible physical acts
on the disputed strip consistent with a claim of ownership, the second
constructive possession ought to prevail. In the latter case, the principle
of potior tempore is simply not good enough reason to preserve for the
benefit of the first possessor the fiction of a continuing constructive possession, given the second possessor's current and visible activity on the
disputed strip. Even if such activity would not be sufficient to oust an
existing corporeal possession, it should be sufficient to oust a "fictitious"
constructive possession.
It is on this issue that the writer disagrees with the Whitley holding.
The court found, as a matter of fact, that the plaintiff had exercised,
during the crucial period, some acts of possession (hunting, wood-cutting,
berry-picking) over the disputed strip constructively possessed by the
defendant."' The court correctly characterized these acts as mere disturbances, not amounting to eviction, and thus insufficient under the
jurisprudence to oust an existing corporeal possession." This jurisprudence,
however, is not an obstacle to holding that these disturbances were sufficient to oust a constructive possession.' For the reasons explained earlier,
it is submitted that such a holding would have been more appropriate
in Whitley.
PETITORY ACTION
Before its amendment in 1981, article 3653 of the Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure provided that in order to prevail in a petitory action
52. See, e.g., Norton v. Addie, 337 So. 2d 432 (La. 1976); Liner v. Louisiana Land
& Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 766 (La. 1975); Pitre v. Tenneco Oil Co., 385 So. 2d 840
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Gaulter v. Gennano, 345 So. 2d 92 (La. App. 1st. Cir. 1977).
53. See Richard v. Comeaux, 260 So. 2d 350, 354 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972) ("The
occasional encroachment by a lawnmower ... is not sufficient indication that one's possession is endangered.").
54. 434 So. 2d at 104.
55. See cases cited supra note 52.
56. All the cases cited supra note 52 involved a conflict between corporeal rather than
constructive possessions.
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against a defendant in possession, the plaintiff "shall . ..make out his
title." 57 The quoted language was interpreted in Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner58
as requiring proof of ownership, which can be accomplished either by
tracing an unbroken chain of title back to the sovereign or by acquisitive
prescription. The enactment of NA 531 in 1979, 59 which provides that
the plaintiff in a petitory action against a defendant in possession "must
prove that he has acquired ownership from a previous owner or by acquisitive prescription," was intended to confirm rather than amend the
Skinner rule.6" In 1981, article 3653 was amended to conform with NA
531 so that the two articles now contain identical language.6 Again, no
substantive change was either intended or has resulted.62 Weaver v. Hailey63
is the first case to reach the appellate courts since the amendments, and
contains an excellent discussion of these issues.4
In Kelso v. Lange, 5 neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was found
to be in possession. The case, therefore, fell within the "better title" part
of NA 531 or article 3653(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., the
plaintiff should prevail by showing a better title than the defendant.
However, the plaintiff was unable to show any title.66 Although he could
57.

Prior to its amendment by Act 256 of 1981 article 3653 provided:
To obtain a judgment recognizing his ownership of the immovable property
or real right, the plaintiff in a petitory action shall:
(1) Make out his title thereto, if the court finds that the defendant is in possession thereof; or
(2) Prove a better title thereto than the defendant, if the court finds that the
latter is not in possession thereof.
58. 294 So. 2d 797 (La. 1974).
59. Act 180 of 1979 enacted NA 531 effective January 1, 1980.
60. See NA 531, comment (b); A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 192, at 517. The
words "acquired ownership from a previous owner" in NA 531 continue to require tracing
of the title back to the sovereign because, absent prescription, this is the only way of knowing whether the "previous owner" was indeed the owner.
61. 1981 La. Acts, No. 256, § 1.
62. See LA. CODE CIv. P. 3653, comment.
63. 416 So. 2d 311 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
64. The Weaver court found the defendant to be in possession and thus required the
plaintiff to prove ownership which he was unable to do because of a break in his chain
of title before 1946. The burden of proof was then shifted to the defendant who also was
unable to show ownership of the one acre in dispute, either by title or by ten-year acquisitive prescription, because his title to one-eighth of a section exempted expressly one
unidentified acre. Plaintiff's action was nevertheless dismissed because he was unable to
carry his burden of proof. The defendant prevailed, not because he was the owner but
because he was in possession and his adversary could not show ownership in himself.
65. 421 So. 2d 973 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
66. The court correctly pointed out that, although the word title in article 3653(1) was
correctly interpreted by Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 294 So. 2d 797 (La. 1974), as equivalent
to ownership, the words better title in article 3653(2) could not mean "better ownership."
421 So. 2d at 975. At the same time, the court rejected the trial court's interpretation of
better title as equivalent to better claim to the property, holding, at least by implication,
that some kind of paper title is necessary. Given the facts of the case the court did not
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show that he was the descendant of someone named George Y. Kelso,
the plaintiff was unable to show that that George Y. Kelso was the same
George Y. Kelso who appeared in the conveyance records as the vendee

of the property in an 1876 act of sale. The action was thus properly
dismissed for failure to carry the requisite burden of proof. The court
pointed out that dismissal of plaintiff's action did not entail any recogni-

tion of the defendant's 6ownership
or possession since the defendant was
7
unable to prove either.
MOVABLES,

IMMOVABLES, AND COMPONENT PARTS

Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:301-:302 impose a sales/use and
lease/rental tax upon "tangible personal property.'16 ' The quoted language
has been interpreted by the jurisprudence as synonymous with corporeal
movables as defined by the Civil Code.69 Two recent cases deal with
classification of certain items as corporeal movables for taxation purposes.
In McNamara v. Oifield Construction Co., 7° the items in question were
board roads, fences, and cattle guards leased by an oilfield service contractor to a drilling cpmpany and placed by him at the drill sites for a
ninety-day period. In McNamara v. Electrode Corp., 71 the items in question were "dimensionally stable anodes" leased by an out-of-state contractor to Louisiana chemical companies and attached by the contractor
in large chlorine-producing units called cells. Applying pre-1978 law, '7 2 the
two courts held that the items in question could not qualify as "imhave to explain what better title means. It is settled that if plaintiff has some title and
the defendant has none, the plaintiff's title is better. See Osborne v. Johnston, 308 So.
2d 464, 468-69 (La. App. 3d Cir.), aff'd, 322 So. 2d 112 (La. 1975); A. YIANNOPOULOS,
supra note 9, § 192, at 522. It is also settled that proof by the plaintiff of a more ancient
title from a common author is now proof of ownership rather than merely proof of better
title, as it was under the old law. Id. § 192, at 521. What is not settled is whether, in
the absence of a common author, proof by the plaintiff of a more ancient title is necessarily proof of a better title.
67. Defendant did not formally reconvene and hence the court did not have to, although
it could under Clayton v. Langston, 311 So. 2d 74 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), adjudicate
defendant's ownership. The court noted, however, that defendant did not prove ownership
since he too was unable to establish any biological connection between his own ancestor,
also named George Y. Kelso, and the George Y. Kelso who appeared as the title holder
in the 1876 sale. The court wrote: "For all we know there may have been three George
Y. Kelsos. Conceivably, the 1876 vendee of the property was not biologically related to
plaintiffs or the Kelsos in the defendant line." 421 So. 2d at 976. Subsequent information
given to this author reveals that there were at least five George Y. Kelsos!
68. LA. R.S. 47:302 provides: "There is hereby levied a tax upon the lease or rental
within this state of each item or article of tangible personal property ....
"
69. See Exxon Corp. v. Triagle, 353 So. 2d 314 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
70. 417 So. 2d 1311 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 422 So. 2d 157 (La. 1982).
71. 418 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 986 (La. 1982).
72. In both cases the tax claims in question were for the years before the 1978 revision
of title I of book II of the Civil Code entitled "Of Things."
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movables by nature" under OA 464, which provides that "[l1ands and
buildings or other constructions, whether they have their foundations in
the soil or not, are immovable by their nature." Under pre-1978
jurisprudence, the question of whether an "other construction" would
qualify as immovable by nature depended on "the degree of integration
or attachment to the soil" and some "degree of permanency." 3 Since

neither of these factors was satisfied in the two cases (loose attachment,
no permanency intended"), the items were classified as movables and thus
subject to taxation. The lack of permanent attachment would lead to the
same result under the post-1978 law, since NA 463 (which replaces OA

464) provides that in order to qualify as component parts of an immovable
(and thus as an immovable), "other constructions" must be "permanently
attached to the ground."" Similarly, the lack of permanent attachment
would prevent these items from being classified as component parts of
a building or other construction under NA 466.6
The two courts also held that the items in question could not qualify
as immovables by destination under paragraph one of OA 468, i.e.,

"[tihings which the owner of a tract of land has placed upon it for its
service and improvement," 77 because they were placed there by the lessee
(and belonged to him) rather than by the landowner." Again, the same
result would be reached under post-1978 law, which has eliminated the
category of immovables by destination. Items which were immovables by
73. Benoit v. Acadia Fuel & Oil Distribs., 315 So. 2d 842, 846 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ refused, 320 So. 2d 550 (La. 1975). Both cases here under discussion relied heavily
on Benoit as well as on Bailey v. Kruithoff, 280 So. 2d 262 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
74. See Oifield Construction, 417 So. 2d at 1316 and Electrode Corp., 418 So. 2d
at 657-59, respectively.
75. NA 463. It provides: "Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the
ground, standing timber and unharvested crops or ungathered fruits of trees, are component parts of a tract of land when they belong to the owner of the ground." Other constructions that are not permanently attached to the ground are movables by virtue of NA
475 and a contrario from NA 463. "[O]ther constructions permanently attached to the
ground," which do not belong to the owner of the ground are also movables by virtue
of NA 475 and a contrario from NA 463 and 464. See NA 464, comment (d).
76. New article 466 provides: "Things permanently attached to a building or other
construction, such as plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical or other installations, are its
component parts. Things are considered permanently attached if they cannot be removed
without substantial damage to themselves or to the immovable to which they are attached."
77. Emphasis added. Old article 468 before its repeal by Act 728 of 1978 provided
as follows: "Things which the owner of a tract of land has placed upon it for its service
and improvement are immovable by destination. . . .All such movables as the owner has
attached permanently to the tenement or to the building, are likewise immovable by destination." The last paragraph of OA 468 was inapplicable for a double reason: lack of unity
of ownership and lack of permanent attachment. This paragraph was replaced in 1978 by
NA 466 which does not require unity of ownership but does require permanent attachment
which was missing in both cases.
78. See Qilfield Construction, 417 So. 2d at 1317; Electrode Corp., 418 So. 2d at 659.
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destination under OA 468 would today be considered either movables,
or, if the formalities of NA 467 were followed, immovables by
declaration."
ACCESSION
80

In Babin v. Babin, the wife used her separate funds to build a house
on the separate property of the husband. Following their divorce, the husband elected to keep the house offering to pay to the wife one half of
the value of the house, 8 ' whereas the wife sought reimbursement for the
full value thereof. The court correctly held that since the case did not
involve use of community funds for the improvement of separate
property," or use of separate funds for the improvement of community
property,8 3 or common labor of both spouses for the improvement of
separate property,8 4 the case was not governed by the Civil Code articles
relating to community property. 5 The court then went on to resolve the
dispute on the basis of the articles on accession as they existed before
their revision in 1979,86 particularly OA 508.87 Old article 508 addressed
79. NA 466, comment (b); see A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 79, at 239.
80. 433 So. 2d 225 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
81. The husband relied on UA 2368, which however was found inapplicable by the
court. See infra text accompanying note 85.
82. UA 2366.
83. UA 2367.
84. UA 2368.
85. 433 So. 2d at 226-27. Similarly, NA 2369.1, enacted in 1981 and replaced in 1982
by LA. R.S. 9:2801, would also be inapplicable since both provisions regulate partition of
community property. For a thorough discussion of these two provisions, see Spaht,
Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-MatrimonialRegimes, 43 LA. L. REV. 513 (1982).
86. The Civil Code articles dealing with accession were amended by Act 180 of 1979
which became effective January 1, 1980. A good argument could be made for applying
the new articles pertaining to reimbursement for improvements made on the land of another,
e.g., NA 496, 497, even with regard to improvements which, as in Babin, were made before
the effective date of the new articles. The reason has to do with the nature of these articles
as essentially particular manifestations of the general notion of unjust enrichment. The law
of unjust enrichment is concerned with the current situation of the parties (and attempts
to accommodate current inequities between them) rather than with existing rights of the
parties which cannot by divested by the retroactive application of new legislation. See also
1979 La. Acts, No. 180, § 5 ("The provisions of this Act shall apply to the ownership
of all things, including those existing on the effective date of this Act; but no provision
may be applied to divest already vested rights or to impair the obligations of contracts.")
87. Old article 508 before its repeal by Act 180 of 1979 read as follows:
When plantations, constructions, and works have been made by a third person,
and with such person's own materials, the owner of the soil has a right to keep
them or to compel this person to take away or demolish the same.
If the owner requires the demolition of such works, they shall be demolished
at the expense of the person who erected them, without any compensation; such
person may even be sentenced to pay damages, if the case require it, for the
prejudice which the owner of the soil may have sustained.
If the owner keeps the works, he owes to the owner of the materials nothing

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 44

the situation where improvements have been made on the land of another
without his consent 8 and determined the respective rights and obligations
of the landowner and the person making the improvements. The rights
of the latter varied greatly, as they do under the new law, 9 depending
on his status as a good faith or bad faith possessor. If he was in good
faith, he could demand from the owner either the value of the materials
and of the workmanship or the enhanced value of the soil." If he was
in bad faith, he could claim only the value of the materials and
workmanship,9" and only if the landowner had chosen to keep the
improvements. 9" In view of the fact that the husband/landowner in Babin
chose to keep the improvement and did not offer evidence about the
enhanced value of the soil, 93 the court did not have to decide the difficult
question of whether to treat the wife as a good faith or bad faith possessor.
The court simply approved the lower court's award to the wife for the
"value of the improvements." 94 The decision is generally correct under
the old law and consistent with pre-1979 jurisprudence. 95
The interesting question is how a Babin-type situation would be
resolved under the post-1979 law. New article 49396 enacted in 1979 would
but the reimbursement of their value and of the price of workmanship, without
any regard to the greater or less value which the soil may have acquired thereby.
Nevertheless, if the plantations, edifices or works have been made by a third
person evicted, but not sentenced to make restitution of the fruits, because such
person possessed bonafide, the owner shall not have a right to demand the demolition of the works, plantations or edifices, but he shall have his choice either to
reimburse the value of the materials and the price of workmanship, or to reimburse a sum equal to the enhanced value of the soil.
88. The phrase "without his consent" is nowhere mentioned either in OA 508 or in
its successors, NA 496 and 497. However, since all three articles speak of "possessors"
who by definition possess adversely to the owner (as distinguished from precarious possessors),
it goes without saying that any buildings or plantings by such possessors are made without
the landowner's consent.
89. See NA 496-497.
90. OA 508 para. 4.
91. OA 508 para. 3. Unlike the good faith possessor, the bad faith possessor was not
entitled to the enhanced value of the soil. Id.
92. OA 508 paras. 2-3. The owner could demand the demolition of the improvements
at the expense of the possessor without having to pay any compensation. He could also
demand damages. OA 508 para. 2.
93. 433 So. 2d at 228.
94.

Id.

95.

See Atkins v. Smith, 207 La. 560, 567, 21 So. 2d 728, 730 (1945), cited with ap-

proval in Babin, 433 -So. 2d at 227-28; see also Comment, ArtificialAccession to Immovables,
28 LA. L. REV. 584 (1968); Comment, Artificial Accession to Immovables, 55 TUL. L. REV.

168, 172-73 (1980); cf. Elrod v. Hart, 146 So. 797 (La. App. 2d. Cir. 1933).
96. New article 493 provides in pertinent part:
Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, and plantings made on the land of another with his consent belong to him who made them.
They belong to the owner of the ground when they are made without his consent.
Things incorporated in, or attached to, an immovable so as to become its com-
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potentially lead to a different result. The first paragraph of this article
addresses the ownership of improvements made on the land of another
and conditions that ownership on the landowner's consent to make the
improvements. If the improvements were made with the landowner's consent, they "belong to him who made them." 97 If they were made without
the landowner's consent, they belong to the landowner. The third
paragraph of article 493 addresses only this latter situation (when the improvements belong to the landowner) and refers to other articles, notably
NA 496 and 497 (which replaced OA 508) for the rights of reimbursement of the person who made the improvements. These rights vary,
depending on whether his possession is in good or bad faith.98 Paragraph
three of NA 493 does not apply to the issue of improvements made on
the land of another which belong to the person who made them because
they were made with the landowner's consent. Nor is there, to the writer's
knowledge, any other Civil Code provision directly applicable to this issue.
The resulting gap in the law would not exist if the following draft
article, initially adopted by the Council of the Louisiana State Law
Institute," had eventually made its way into the Code. This draft article
read as follows:
Article 494. Constructions with the consent of the owner of the immovable.
When constructions, plantings, or works are made with the consent of the owner of an immovable, as by a lessee, a coowner,
a purchaser under a contract to sell, or by a precarious possessor,
the person who has made the improvements may, in the absence
of other provision of law or juridical act, remove them subject
to his obligation of restoring the property to its former condition. If he does not remove them after demand, the owner of
the immovable may have them removed at the expense of the person who made them or elect to keep them and pay, at his opponent parts under Articles 465 and 466 belong to the owner of the immovable.
One who lost the ownership of a thing to the owner of an immovable may
have a claim against him or against a third person in accordance with the following provisions.
97. NA 493 para. 1 (emphasis added). See also NA 491 (enunciates the general principle that horizontal divisions of ownership are permissible under the conditions specified
therein). Babin would fall clearly into this situation since the building of the house by the
wife on the separate property of the husband must have been with his consent.
98. It must be recognized that NA 496 and 497 dealing with possessors can apply only
by analogy to precarious possessors such as lessees, usufructuaries, coowners, etc., who
are on the land with the landowner's consent but make improvements without the landowner's
consent. This small gap would not exist if NA 496 and 497 were phrased in terms of improvements made in good or bad faith rather than persons who possess in good or bad
faith. For a discussion of the reasons for this gap, see infra text accompanying notes 122-25.
99. See LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, REVISION OF BOOK II OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL
CODE OF 1870: TITLE II, OWNERSH', art. 494, comments, at I (Council Meeting Nov. 3-4,
1978) [hereinafter cited as REVISION].
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tion, the current value of the materials and100of the workmanship
or the enhanced value of the immovable.
Unfortunately, in a subsequent meeting of the Council on March 3, 1979,
the above article was replaced' 0 ' by what now appears as NA 495, a considerably narrower provision.' 2 New article 495 is narrower in scope in
that it only provides for things incorporated into an immovable "under
Articles 465 and 466,"103 and does not encompass buildings, plantings,
or other constructions made on the land of another under NA 463 and
paragraph one of NA 493. Although the minutes of the meeting are inconclusive as to the exact reasons for the change,'0 4 the comments to NA
495 clearly suggest that the article is not intended to encompass buildings
and other constructions made on the land of another with his consent.' 00
Thus the gap remains, and short of legislative correction, it can be filled
only by analogous application of other Civil Code articles. The following
alternative solutions come to mind.
Alternative One: Since the person who built the house (hereinafter
referred to as "builder") owns it under the express provision of paragraph
one of NA 493, he should be entitled to all the prerogatives of ownership, including the right to the exclusive use and enjoyment of it,'0 6 and
should be protected by the appropriate action' 7 against anyone unlawfully interfering with such rights."'8 However, this solution overlooks the
100. Id. art. 494, at 1.
101. See REvisioN: TITLE II, OWNERSHIP, art. 494, at 6-7 (Council Meeting Mar. 2-3,
1979), supra note 99; LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, at 3-5
(Minutes Mar. 2-3, 1979).
102. New article 495 provides:
One who incorporates in, or attaches to, the immovable of another, with his
consent, things that become component parts of the immovable under Articles
456 and 466, may, in the absence of other provision of law or juridical acts,
remove them subject to his obligation of restoring the property to its former
condition.
If he does not remove them after demand, the owner of the immovable may
have them removed at the expense of the person who made them or elect to keep
them and pay, at his option, the current value of the materials and of the workmanship or the enhanced value of the immovable.
103. NA 495.
104. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, at 3-5 (Minutes Mar.
2-3, 1979).
105. Comment (c) under NA 495 provides: "[New article 495] does not apply to buildings,
other constructions permanently attached to the ground, standing timber . . . dealt with
in Articles [sic] 491, supra. [These things] are not component parts of a tract of land when
they belong to a person other than the owner of the ground." It obvious that neither NA
491 nor the more directly pertinent NA 493 resolves the question of the ultimate fate of
these improvements.
106. NA 477.
107. NA 526.
108. "Buildings, other constructions, and plantings made on the land of another with
his consent belong to the person who made them. Accordingly, persons ... erecting edifices
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simple fact that the house is sitting on the land of another who is thus
deprived of his right to use his own property."0 9 His consent to the building
of a house cannot be lightly equated to an implied alienation of that part
of the ground or the granting of a perpetual servitude." 0
Alternative Two: Analogize this situation to that of buildings built
in good faith and partially encroaching on an adjacent estate. New article
670 authorizes the court to allow the building to remain and grants a
"predial servitude on the land occupied by the building upon payment
of compensation for the value of the servitude . . . and for any other
damage . . . suffered."'''
Alternative Three: Analogize this situation to that of standing timber
belonging to someone other than the landowner" 2 and recognize (as has
been recognized with regard to timber)" 3 that the two horizontal estates
are simply not of equal rank and dignity. The building could be allowed
to remain on the ground for a "reasonable period" but should eventually
be removed,"" unless in the meantime a different arrangement is reached
[on the land of another] are fully protected in their relations with the landowner." A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 84, at 257-58 (emphasis added). "A person who erects a building

or other constructions on the land of another with his consent has unlimited rights of ownership in those improvements. The owner of the building on the land of another may destroy,
remove, lease, or sell the building without consulting the landowner." Comment, supra
note 95, 55 Tm. L. REV. at 180. See also id. at 176.
109. This solution also attributes to the word ownership its full and unconditional meaning.
However, a closer analysis of the articles on accession reveals that the term ownership is
used rather loosely. It usually means a conditional kind of ownership. See infra note 125.
110. The most that can be made of this consent is to equate it with the granting of
a servitude under a term or under a resolutory condition.
111. NA 670. It provides:
When a landowner constructs in good faith a building that encroaches on an
adjacent estate and the owner of that estate does not complain within a reasonable
time after he knew or should have known of the encroachment, or in any event
complains only after the construction is substantially completed the court may
allow the building to remain. The owner of the building acquires a predial servitude on the land occupied by the building upon payment of compensation for
the value of the servitude taken and for any other damage that the neighbor has
suffered.
112. See NA 463-464, 491, 493.
113. "The . . . contention . . . that when separated in ownership from the land on
which it stands, the timber . . . [acquires] equal rank and dignity with the land ....
amounts to a legal heresy, and is contrary to numerous decisions of this court." Willetts
Wood Prods. Co. v. Concordia Land & Timber Co., 169 La. 240, 242-43, 124 So. 841,
841-42 (1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 742 (1930). "The ownership of segregated timber is
neither perpetual nor of equal rank and dignity with the ownership of the ground." A.
YIMAaNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 93, at 282.
114. Cf. Willetts Wood Prods. Co. v. Concordia Land & Timber Co., 169 La. 240,
124 So. 841 (1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 742 (1930). "Courts give effect to the presumed
or probable intent of the parties and accord a reasonable time for the removal of timber
in the light of all the relevant circumstances." A. YLANNOPOUmLOS, supra note 9, § 93, at 283.
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by the parties. This solution, however, is probably uneconomical and may
be unduly harsh on the owner of the building, or, if the time fixed for
the removal of the building is too long, on the owner of the ground.
Alternative Four: Apply NA 495 by analogy," 5 a solution made more
plausible in that, of all other potentially applicable articles, NA 495 is
the only one addressing improvements made with the landowner's consent. However, the express language of the article confining it to things
which become component parts of an immovable "under Articles 465 and
466" 16 as well as the accompanying comments,' 7 stand in the way of
such an analogous application. Unlike a house built on the land of another
with his consent, which is owned by the builder (and thus does not become
a component part of the land)," 8 the component parts provided for in
NA 465 and 466 are incorporated into the immovable in such a way as
to become integral parts of the immovable. For that reason, such component parts are declared to be insusceptible of separate ownership." '9
Whether this conceptual difference is a sufficient reason to differentiate
between the two sets of improvements for purposes of removal or reimbursement is a debatable proposition, but the language of the NA 495
suggests an affirmative answer.'2 0 A more pragmatic reason for not applying NA 495 analogously to the situation under discussion is the harshness to the landowner of one of the options given by the article. According to the second paragraph of the article, if the builder does not remove
the improvements either voluntarily or upon the landowner's demand, the
latter "may have them removed at the expense of the person who made
them."' This solution is plausible enough for improvements made under
NA 465 and 466, which are relatively small in size or value, but it may
become economically unrealistic when, as in the case under discussion,
the improvement consists of an entire house.
Alternative Five: Apply NA 496 and 497 by analogy.'

It must be

115.
116.
117.

NA 495 quoted supra note 102.
Id.
See NA 495, comment (c) quoted supra note 105.

118.
119.
120.

See NA 464.
See NA 493 para. 2.
Unless it was accidental, the replacement of the earlier draft of article 494, quoted

supra text accompanying note 100, by the more narrow NA 495 and its comments, quoted
supra note 105, suggests that such differentiation was contemplated by the redactors.
121. NA 495 para. 2.
122. New article 496 provides:.
When constructions, plantings, or works are made by a possessor in good faith,
the owner of the immovable may not demand their demolition and removal. He
is bound to keep them and at his option to pay to the possessor either the cost
of the materials and of the workmanship, or their current value, or the enhanced
value of the immovable.
New article 497 provides:
When constructions, plantings, or works are made by a bad faith possessor,
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emphasized that these articles can apply only by analogy in the situation
under discussion for three reasons: (a) the builder is not a possessor in
the true sense, as contemplated by the two articles, but rather is a
precarious possessor;' 23 (b) unlike the possessors of NA 496 and 497, who
'24
by definition do not have the landowner's consent to be on the property
and much less to make improvements thereon, the builder has both kinds

of consent; and (c) unlike the possessors of NA 496 and 497, he is the
owner of the improvements under the express language of paragraph one
of NA 493. 12 Despite these obstacles, however, the analogous applica-

tion of these articles encounters fewer technical problems and seems to
satisfy common sense more than any of the four preceding alternatives.
The only remaining question is whether the person building the house
with the landowner's consent should be treated as a good faith or bad

faith possessor. Again, it accords better with equity and common sense
to treat him as a good faith possessor in light of his lawful presence on
the property as well as his lawful building of the house.' 26 His right to
the owner of the immovable may keep them or he may demand their demolition
and removal at the expense of the possessor, and, in addition, damages for the
injury that he may have sustained. If he does not demand demolition and removal,
he is bound to pay at his option either the current value of the materials and
of the workmanship of the separable improvements that he has kept or the enhanced
value of the immovable.
123. See supra note 88. The pre-1979 jurisprudence has applied these articles to precarious
possessors. See, e.g., Elrod v. Hart, 146 So. 797 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933). Since 1979 the
articles on accession have been made directly applicable to one species of precarious possessors,
i.e., lessees by virtue of NA 2726, enacted in 1979, which provides that "[tihe right of
the lessee to remove improvements and additions he has made to the thing let is governed
by Article 493."
124. The very definition of a possessor as a person who exercises physical authority
over a thing with the intent to own it, see NA 3421, 3424, negates any consent by the
true owner. See supra note 88.
125. However, it must be recognized that the Civil Code uses the term ownership rather
loosely in this area. For instance, under paragraph two of NA 493 "[tlhings incorporated
in, or attached to, an immovable so as to become its component parts under Articles 465
and 466 belong to the owner of the immovable," NA 493 para. 2, regardless of whether
they were placed there with his consent. See also A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, § 83,
at 245. However, the person who put them there with the consent of the landowner may,
under NA 495, "remove them subject to his obligation of restoring the property to its former
condition." Furthermore, if the owner of the immovable elects to keep these attachments
he will, despite his ownership of them, have to reimburse the person who made them according to paragraph two of 495. Similarly, the landowner "owns" improvements made
on his land without his consent, NA 493 para. 1, but, in order to keep them he has to
pay the reimbursements provided for in NA 496 and 497. Compare with the pre-1979
jurisprudence which had held that, despite the language of OA 504, the improvements belong
to the person who made them unless and until the landowner exercised his right to keep
them under OA 508. See Ouachita Parish School Bd. v. Clark, 197 La. 131, 1 So. 2d
54 (1941); Cloud v. Cloud, 145 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
126. Treating him as a bad faith possessor, as some of the pre-1979 jurisprudence treated
precarious possessors, see Elrod v. Hart, 146 So. 797 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933), would be
unduly harsh since doing so would mean placing all the cards in the hand of the landowner.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

. [Vol. 44

be reimbursed for the value of the house should thus be governed by
NA 496 rather than NA 497 with the following suggested modifications:

(a) New article 496 provides that the landowner "may not demand . .
demolition and removal [of the improvements]. He is bound to keep
them . . . ." In the situation under discussion, this should be so only
if the builder has not elected to remove it, as he is clearly entitled to

do by virtue of his ownership under paragraph one of NA 493. (b) New
article 496 grants to the landowner the option of whether to pay (i) the

cost of materials and of the workmanship, (ii) their current value, or (iii)
the enhanced value of the immovable. Since he is more than likely to
opt for the lowest of the three, it may be advisable, in the situation under
discussion, either to give the choice among the three items to the person

who built the house' 27 or better yet leave the choice to the court.
Alternative Six: Apply none of the above provisions and resort instead to the general principle of unjust enrichment. One court has done
so in a factually similar case.' 28 However, unjust enrichment should remain what it was meant to be-the last resort, to be utilized only when
Under NA 497, the landowner could, if only because of spite, demand demolition and removal
of the house which could be uneconomical to both spouses. He may also elect to keep
the improvements and still pay nothing if he can show that the improvements are "inseparable." See NA 497, comments (c), (d); A. YIANNOPOUtos, supra note 9, § 198, at
538-39. The only case in which the landowner must pay something under NA 497 is when
he elects to keep separable improvements, and even then he has the choice of paying "either
the current value of the materials and of the workmanship . . . or the enhanced value
of the immovable," NA 497, whichever is lower.
127. This solution may be going too far to the other extreme. A middle-ground solution
would be to leave the option with the landowner but to impose an absolute minimum:
In the event that the current value of the improvements or the enhanced value of the immovable are less than the original cost of the materials and workmanship the landowner
must pay the latter.
128. Orleans Onyx, Inc. v. Buchanan, 428 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983). This
case involved the installation by a contractor (plaintiff) of certain onyx products in the
bathrooms of a house at the behest of the prospective purchaser of the house under an
oral agreement to sell. The sale was never completed, and when the prospective purchaser
became insolvent, the contractor sued the owner of the house for the value of the improvements. Without considering the Civil Code articles on accession, the court concluded
that the defendant was unjustifiably enriched at the expense of the plaintiff and remanded
to the trial court "for determination of the exact amount owed." Id. at 845. The correctness of the court's application of the principles of unjust enrichment has been seriously
questioned on substantive grounds by Professor Harrell of The Louisiana State Unviersity
Law School. See Harrell, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Security Devices, 44 LA,
L. REv. 535, 549-51 (1983). Be that as it may, it seems to this author that, before
resorting to the general principle of unjust enrichment, the court should have considered
the possible applicability of NA 495. This article would be directly applicable if, as it seems
likely, the improvements were made with the defendant's acquiescence, if not consent (defendant herein was apparently living in the house at the time of the improvements). Only if
this kind of acquiescence is not tantamount to the "consent" contemplated by NA 495,
should one resort to the principle of unjust enrichment.
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the Civil Code provides no solution either directly or by analogy. 12' 9
Hopefully, the preceding discussion has demonstrated that there are sufficient analogous interpretations to choose from without resorting to unjust enrichment. The preceding discussion may have also demonstrated
that none of the above solutions is fully satisfactory. If that is the case,
legislative correction is both necessary and desirable.
PREDIAL

SERVITUDES

Old article 780 provided:

If the title by which a passage is granted does not designate
its breadth nor the manner in which it is to be used . . . the
use which the person to whom the servitude is granted previously
made of it will serve to interpret the title.

If there was no such use made of it before, the probable intention of the parties must be considered, and the purpose for which
the passage is granted.' 30
This article was replaced in 1977 by NA 749, which provides that "[i]f
the title is silent as to the extent and manner of use of the servitude,
the intention of the parties is to be determined in the light of its
'
purpose." 131
According to the official comments, the new article "changes
the law as it establishes a broad principle according to which the extent
and manner of use of the servitude is determined."' 32 The change apparently consists of the fact that past use of the servitude is no longer
controlling in interpreting a vague title. There is, however, nothing to
prevent consideration of past use as evidence of the parties' intention under
the new article.' 33
In Harris v. Darrin Corp.,'3 4 a conventional servitude of passage was
established in 1969 and was silent as to the exact breadth of the passage,
but not as to its manner of use or purpose since it purported to provide
the grantee with "ingress and egress of sufficient width so as to enable
vehicular traffic and/or pedestrians to get to .. .the property."'3 3 The
court held that the case is governed by the old law, but found OA 780
129. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 21; Edmonston v. A-Second Co. Mortgage Co., 289 So.
2d 116 (La. 1974); Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 251 La. 624, 205 So., 2d 422 (1967).
130. As it appeared prior to its repeal by 1977 La. Acts, No. 514, § 1 (effective Jan.
1, 1978).

131. 1977 La. Acts, No. 514, § I (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
132. NA 749, comment.
133. "Article 749, as revised in 1977, speaks of the purpose of the servitude and does
not mention past use. However, there was no intention to change the law and past use
ought to continue to be relevant." A. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 149 in 4 LouISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 415 n.5 (1983).
134. 431 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
135. Id. at 442.
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inapplicable on the assumption that the article applies only when the title
establishing the servitude is silent on both the breadth and the manner
of the use of the servitude.' 3 6 Nevertheless, the court went on to fix the
breadth of the servitude at twenty-six feet on the basis of the use actually
made by the grantee.' 37 The concurring judge agreed in result but felt
that the court's holding could only be based on OA 780, which is applicable when the title is silent on either the breadth or the manner of
the use of the servitude.' 38 The dissenting judge would apply instead NA
749 together with NA 730 (which is the same provision as OA 753), the
latter of which provides that "doubt as to the . . . extent, or manner
of exercise of a predial servitude shall be resolved in favor of the servient
estate.' 3 9
Assuming that the case is governed by the old law, one must agree
with the concurring judge that OA 780 is the applicable provision. One
may also agree with the majority in not applying (though not in failing
to consider) OA 753, since that article merely announces a general principle for the interpretation of servitudes which must yield to the more specific
principle of OA 780. The real question, however, is whether, despite the
fact that the servitude in question was established in 1969, the case should
be governed by post-1978 law. Section seven of Act 514 of 1977, which
enacted into law the new provisions on predial servitudes, provides that
the new legislation applies to all predial servitudes, including those in existence on its effective date, January 1, 1978, but adds that "no provision may be applied to divest already vested rights or to impair the obligations of contracts." Although there may be room for a contrary opinion,
it is doubtful whether the application of NA 749 would either impair the
obligations of contracts or divest the servitude grantee of his vested
rights.'4 0 Strictly speaking, there is no contract to be impaired on the
specific issue of the breadth of the passage,' 4 ' nor can the servitude grantee
be said to have a vested right in using the past use of the servitude as
the sole criterion for determining the servitude's breadth. Nevertheless,
assuming that the case is governed by the new law, the dissenting judge's
position that NA 749 should be read together with NA 730 is entirely
136. Id. at 443 n.4. This interpretation is obviously too technical and narrow.
137. As authority for its holding the court quoted Yiannopoulos: "Insufficient descriptions as to the location or extent of a predial servitude may be remedied by actual use
of the servitude over a certain area of the servient estate." A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note
133, § 129, at 373.
138. 431 So. 2d at 446 (Cain, J., concurring).
139. Id. (Ponder, J., dissenting). The judge found that a thirteen-foot passage was
sufficient.
140. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 133, § 2, at 5-7, and authorities cited therein.
141. A contrary opinion would be that there is a contract on the specific issue, except
that its terms are unknown and must be ascertained by looking to the unexpressed intention
of the parties.
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plausible. Unlike its predecessor, OA 780, NA 749 is of the same level
of generality as NA 730 (and OA 753), thus rendering inapplicable the
principle that the more specific provision prevails over the more general.
The two articles could, therefore, be read together so that "when the
title is silent as to the extent and manner of use of the servitude,"'4 2
the court should look for "the intention of the parties in the light of
.. . [the servitude's] purpose,'. 3 bearing in mind that doubts as to the
44
parties' intentions "shall be resolved in favor of the servient estate."'
In Cazes v. Robertson,' 5 a landowner divided his property into two
tracts, Y and Z, so that tract Z became land-locked, and he made the
following declaration on the survey map of resubdivision: "I . . . do
hereby dedicate the 60 ft. wide servitude of passage shown hereon for
the perpetual private use of the owner of tract 'Z' '1 6 Tract Z was
subsequently conveyed to the plaintiff, and tract Y, that is, the tract
traversed by the servitude, was conveyed to the defendant. The plaintiff
sought to enjoin the defendant from use of the servitude and sought a
declaratory judgment recognizing the plaintiff's right to the exclusive use
of the servitude. Both requests were denied by the court on the following
grounds: (1) Since the sale to the plaintiff contained no mention of a
servitude, the servitude was a legal servitude (apparently under NA 694),111
not a conventional one. Brian v. Bowlus'4 8 was distinguished. (2) The articles on legal servitudes' 9 do not give to the owner of the enclosed estate
the right of exclusive use of the passage.'
(3) It was not the intention
of the grantor of the servitude to give thi grantee exclusive use of the
servitude. '3
To begin with, the lack of any mention of a servitude in the act by
which the vendee acquires an estate does not necessarily mean that there
is no servitude in favor of or burdening such estate.' 52 The question
142. NA 749.
143. NA 749.
144. NA 730.
145. 421 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
146. Id. at 424.
147. NA 694 is quoted supra note 30.
148. 399 So. 2d 545 (La. 1981). Brian involved identical facts except that the sale of
the enclosed estate by the former common owner of both estates contained a servitude grant
to the vendee. The court held on rehearing that, since it was contained in a contract, the
servitude was conventional rather than legal.
149. E.g., NA 690-692, 695.
150. 421 So. 2d at 425-26.
151. Id. at 426.
152. See McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 765, 125 So. 2d 154, 157 (1960):
The plaintiff attempts to equate "title" . . . with the deed, or act of sale, by
which the servient estate is acquired ....
The conclusion is inescapable that "title" as used in article 766 [of the Civil Code of 1870 and NA 739] refers to
the method by which the servitude may be acquired and does not relate exclusively to the conveyance of the servient estate.
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depends instead on whether a servitude was validly created by title or
by prescription in the past.' If it was created, it will continue "running
4
with the land," i.e., with both the servient and the dominant estate'1
(as long as the servitude has not been extinguished by non-use for ten
years),' 5 regardless of whether the servitude is mentioned in subsequent
conveyances of either the dominant or the servient estate.' 56 Thus, the
real question in Cazes should have been whether the declaration by the
former common owner of tracts Y and Z established a servitude by destination under NA 741 in favor of tract Z.1'5 In order for such a servitude
to be established, the declaration on the survey map of resubdivision must
be recorded in the conveyance records.'
Unfortunately, the case contains no information on this issue, and the parties apparently did not
raise it.
Having found no volitional act sufficient to establish a servitude, the
court was bound to conclude that the servitude was imposed by operation of law, apparently relying on NA 694.'1 To be sure, there is ample
153. Aside from legal servitudes, conventional predial servitudes are established by title,
NA 708, 722, i.e., any juridical act "by which immovables may be transferred," NA 722,
by acquisitive prescription, NA 740, 742, or by destination of the owner. NA 741. Unlike
servitudes established by prescription, servitudes established by title or nonapparent servitudes
established by destination must be recorded in order to be assertible against third parties.
See UA 2266; A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 133, § 125, at 358-59.
154. See NA 650 para. 2; infra note 156.
155. See NA 753-759.
156. "[Ilt is not necessary, once [a servitude] has been established, that the instrument
by which one subsequently acquires the property mention the servitude for it to continue
to affect the land." Journet v. Gerard, 173 So. 2d 263, 266 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). See
McGuffy v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So. 2d 154 (1960); A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 133,
§ 126, at 361-62.
157. New article 741 provides:
Destination of the owner is a relationship established between two estates owned
by the same owner that would be a predial servitude if the estates belonged to
different owners.
When the two estates cease to belong to the same owner, unless there is express
provision to the contrary, an apparent servitude comes into existence of right
and a nonapparent servitude comes into existence if the owner has previously
filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable
is located a formal declaration establishing the destination.
158. NA 741. Recordation would be necessary if the servitude in-question is nonapparent. Apparent servitudes, on the other hand, "come into existence of right," NA 741,
without the need of recordation, the moment "the two estates cease to belong to the same
owner." NA 741. The court refers to the servitude as "an existing passageway" at the
time the two estates were still owned by the same person. This could render the servitude
an apparent one and thus susceptible to creation by informal destination without recordation under NA 741. However, under the law in force at the time (1969), noncontinuous
servitudes such as the servitude of passage, whether apparent or not, could be established
only by title. OA 766.
159. New article 694 provides:
When in the case of partition, or a voluntary alienation of an estate or of
a part thereof, property alienated or partitioned becomes enclosed, passage shall
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doctrinal authority for the proposition that a servitude created by operation of NA 694, as distinguished from the servitude imposed by NA 689,"6"

is a conventional rather than a legal servitude.' 6 However, this distinction should have no bearing on the particular question facing the court
in Cazes, namely whether the owner of the dominant estate was entitled
to the exclusive use of the servitude.' 6 2 A more appropriate distinction
would be the distinction between servitudes already in existence, whether

legal or conventional,' 63 and servitudes not yet in existence, which a court
is called upon to fix on the basis of the codal provisions on legal servitudes. For servitudes already established, the extent of the right conferred by the servitude is determined by examining the act establishing the
servitude. For servitudes not yet established and which a court is called

upon to establish, the extent of the right to which the owner of the serbe furnished gratuitously by the owner of the land on which the passage was
previously exercised, even if it is not the shortest route to the public road, and
even if the act of alienation or partition does not mention a servitude of passage.
Although this article is nowhere cited in the Cazes opinion, the facts fit neatly under the
scope of the article. Moreover, the court's citing of Brian v. Bowlus, 399 So. 2d 545 (La.
1981), and Patin v. Richard, 291 So. 2d 879 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), both of which involved
NA 694, confirms the suspicion that the Cazes court was thinking in terms of this article.
160. New article 689 provides: "The owner of an estate that has no access to a public
road may claim a right of passage over neighboring property to the nearest public road.
He is bound to indemnify his neighbor for the damage he may occasion."
161. "Article 694 ought to be taken to establish, in accordance with pertinent French
doctrine, a right for the creation of a conventional servitude of passage. This servitude
A. YIANNAPoULos,
is juxtaposed with the legal servitude of passage under Article 689 .
supra note 133, § 99, at 297 (footnote omitted).
Article 694 establishes a rule founded on the implied intent of the parties to an
agreement rather than a limitation on the ownership of the estate of the vendor
... . The demand of a right of passage under Article 694 is thus the exercise
of a contractual right and is to be contrasted with a demand for a forced passage
under Article 689, which is based directly on law.
Id. § 99, at 299. See also the French authorities cited therein. Id. § 99, at 291 n.2. It
appears that this reasoning was implicitly rejected by Brian v. Bowlus, 399 So. 2d 545 (La.
1981), which held-that the servitude in question was conventional not so much because
it derived from NA 694 but because it was contained in a contract.
162. Incidentally, it appears to this author that this distinction was of nothing but academic
significance under the facts of Brian v. Bowlus. See supra note 148. The issue in Brian
was the right to relocate the servitude which had become more burdensome on the servient
estate. If the servitude was legal in nature the applicable provision would be NA 695; if
conventional, it would be NA 748. Although the wording of the two articles is slightly
different, this difference would not produce a different result in Brian. See A. YiANoPouLos,
supra note 133, § 99, at 300 ("despite slightly different verbiage, Articles 695 and 748 do
not impose different requirements for the relocation of a previously fixed right of way.").
163. The common denominator of servitudes falling under this category is not the legal
origin of the particular servitude but rather the very fact of the servitude's existence, either
on paper or on the ground. This category would include servitudes established: (a) voluntarily by juridical act including destination of the pere du famille, (b) by acquisitive prescription, and (c) by judicial decision or by agreement under the dictates of the codal articles
on legal servitudes.
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vient estate is entitled will be determined by the court de novo on the
basis of the applicable provisions of law.I" In this sense, the Cazes court
was perhaps inconsistent in first holding that no servitude existed 6 ' and
then looking at the grantor's intent to determine that he did not intend
the servitude to be for the exclusive use of the owner of tract Z.' 66 The
servitude either existed in fact, in which case all the discussion on legal
servitudes was unnecessary, or did not exist in fact but was imposed by
operation of law, in which case the grantor's intent is immaterial. Accepting the court's assumption that the servitude was a legal one, the question becomes whether the servitude is imposed by NA 689 or by NA 694.
If it is imposed by NA 689, the owner of the enclosed estate is, for an
appropriate price, entitled to a passage "suitable for the kind of traffic
that is reasonably necessary for the use of that estate,"' 6' "along the
shortest route . . . at the location least injurious to the intervening
lands."' 68 This passage ought to be for the exclusive use 9 of the owner
of the enclosed estate, unless he is willing to accept a nonexclusive passage
(in exchange for a lower price) or unless special reasons militate in favor
of such a solution. If the servitude arises under NA 694, the owner of
the enclosed estate is entitled to a gratuitous passage, at the location at
which "the passage was previously exercised, even if it is not the shortest
route."' 1 " Whether this passage would be exclusive depends on whether
the "passage previously exercised" was itself exclusive and whether the
164. For servitudes imposed by NA 689, see NA 689-692, and by NA 694, see the article itself.
165. The act from [vendor] to [vendee] makes no mention of a transfer of a
servitude to the vendees ....
From the record, we find that the servitude of passage in the instant case is
a legal servitude, not a conventional servitude. It arose by operation of law; it
was not established by mutual assent of the parties in a contract.
421 So. 2d at 424.
166. "We thus find that there was no intention on the part of [vendor] to exclude from
use of the servitude, which was actually an existing passageway, those tenants living nearby
... .It was not intended to award Tract Z's owner an exclusive franchise of passage."
421 So. 2d at 426.
167. NA 690.
168. NA 692. See NA 689-690. Both NA 690 and 692 are cited by the court as authority
for the proposition that the owner of an enclosed estate is not entitled to an exclusive passage.
It is respectfully submitted that these articles do not address the issue of the exclusiveness
of the passage but rather the different issues of the width ("kind of traffic ... necessary,"
NA 690) and location of the passage. NA 692.
169. One should start with this assumption since a predial servitude is a real right in
the thing of another, see NA 646, and one of the characteristics of real rights is the element
of exclusiveness, i.e., the legally protected power to exclude all others, including the owner
of the servient estate, from the enjoyment of the right conferred by the servitude. For this
characteristic of real rights, see A. YIA NOlPOULOS, supra note 9, § 144, at383-85, and
the authorities cited therein.
170. NA 694.
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alienation or partition contemplated by NA 694 resulted in more than
one estate becoming enclosed.' 71
171. This was exactly the situation in Patin v. Richard, 291 So. 2d 879 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1974), which the Cazes court cited as authority for its holding that the owner of the
enclosed estate is not entitled to an exclusive passage. In Patin a landowner subdivided
his property into three lots designated consecutively as lots A, B, and C, so that B and
C became enclosed and lot A was the only one with access to a public road. By a single
act of sale the three lots were sold to three different purchasers. Applying OA 701 (same
as NA 694) the court held that the owner of lot C was entitled to a gratuitous legal servitude of passage over lots B and A and that the owner of lot B was entitled to the same
right of passage over lot A. Obviously the passage over lot A was for the joint benefit
of both lots B and C. But the court held that the passage over lot B, as well, was for
the joint benefit of both lots B and C, apparently because this was the only way in which
lot B would not remain enclosed. Unlike Patin, Cazes involved only two rather than three
lots and the meager information contained in the case does not allow a safe comparison
with Patin. It remains equally unclear to this author whether "those tenants living nearby,"
421 So. 2d at 426 (emphasis added), and whose use of the servitude the plaintiff sought
to enjoin, were living on tract Y or "nearby." One cannot overemphasize how much depends
on this tiny factual question.

